In this paper I outline several general processes in EE economies, which are seen as important elements of transformation of their systems of innovation and are evolving between the restructuring and erosion of potentially viable R&D and technology capacities.
Introduction
In existing analyses of post-socialist Eastern European (EE) economies, 1 the problem of technological restructuring is pushed aside as the policy discussions are focused mainly on problems of macro-economic adjustment and privatization. An implicit assumption is that, once problems of macroeconomic stability and ownership restructuring have been overcome, issues of industrial and technological restructuring will in some way take care of themselves through the normal operation of open market economy mechanisms. It is assumed that development follows from stabilization and transition, and that the creation of an institutional system of open market economy is possible without active industrial and technological restructuring.
2 The starting point of this paper is somewhat different: stabilization and transition ' NSI has become a widely accepted concept in innovation studies for two reasons. First, it is an attempt to go beyond R&D in explaining innovation dynamics. The concept assumes that the rate of technical change docs not depend only on the scale of different countries' R&D but also on inter-organizational learning processes. Second, these processes are very much influenced by the institutional set-ups that foster competition and co-ordination. The notion encompasses not only a stock of knowledge (R&D stock or technology capital) but also institutional elements which strongly influence growth dynamics. The interrelation of knowledge creation and diffusion with the institutional set-up is an important potential advantage of this approach in explaining how technical opportunities convert into economic growth. ' This neglect of functional aspects and overemphasis of institutional aspects of S&T is present in OECD studies on S&T policies in economies in transition (see e.g. OECD, 1992 OECD, , 1994 OECD, , 1996 . have a new wave of functional transformations which must be taken into account. 6 Second, the viability of R&D institutions in post-socialist conditions cannot be evaluated by using standard OECD indicators (patents, citations and publications, innovations, etc.) and applying them to the socialist period. These would be misleading, since performance criteria in the socialist systems were different. These systems produced research results mainly in the form of 'grey' literature that is difficult to capture in the OECD-based statistical systems. This is the reason why it is so difficult to estimate the real dynamic R&D potential of post-socialist economies. Closed economies, low valuation of published journal outputs, high practical orientation of institutes (despite their distance from the production practice) combined with extremely limited access to international cooperation: these are all features that make such an exercise quite dubious if the results are to be interpreted in a straightforward manner. 7 Third, transformation of R&D and NSI in post-socialist economies cannot be understood if confined to science systems. R&D institutions were part of production networks that are now undergoing either restructuring or erosion. From this it follows that, whenever possible, we should analyse R&D as a part of changing production networks.
With these caveats in mind, the main questions I want to discuss in this paper are the following: What are the effects of marketization and the main characteristics of erosion of post-socialist R&D systems in EE? Are there already some emerging patterns of restructuring that could give us an idea about future directions for the development of NSI in EE? I will argue that the transformation of NSI in the post-socialist economies of EE is evolving between the restructuring and erosion of potentially viable R&D capacities. One or other outcome is the result of privatization strategies, macro-economic policies and the corresponding strategies of domestic and foreign capital and state activities.
In Part 2, I will set the stage by briefly summarizing the initial conditions of the transformation of socialist into post-socialist NSI. Part 3 describes the main manifestations of the 1989-1994 erosion of R&D systems and is focused mainly on formal R&D systems. The main processes analysed are marginalization of R&D, changes in industrial demand for R&D, polarization of R&D spectrum and changes in institutional landscape. In Part 4, I outline the dominant restructuring processes of 'technology capital' by focusing on 'brain relocation' from R&D, internal (micro) restructuring, academic spin-offs, privatization and internationalization of S&T in EE. Finally, I draw conclusions and outline directions for further research.
National Systems of Innovation in Post-socialist Countries: Initial Conditions
The post-socialist economies have inherited: (i) relatively well-developed, absorptive innovation and R&D capacities; (ii) externalized and, in market economy terms, highly unbalanced S&T systems; and (iii) a system of weak incentives (soft budget constraints) based on personal (institutional) networks.
(i) Most European post-socialist economies are upper-middle-income economies (EBRD, 1994) . 8 When compared with other newly industrializing countries (NICs), European post-socialist economies have comparable education enrolment ratios, which indicates to a certain extent their potential ability to absorb new technologies. In terms of publications and US patenting, smaller EE countries stand at levels comparable to less developed EU countries. On these two latter indicators, former Soviet republics ranked rather low, primarily due to closed systems that inhibited and controlled international cooperation. In terms of R&D indicators (personnel and relative expenditures), EE countries ranked much above other NICs. 9 [For a more detailed discussion see Radosevic (1994) .] However, these developed capacities have not, in the past, been turned into capabilities, i.e. into effective use of available capacities. The technological level of these economies, if analysed in terms of foreign trade, shows them to be quite in line with the expected comparative advantages of middle-income economies (Murrel, 1990) . Export is dominated by commodities (traditional goods, fuels, natural resources), with very few examples of complex products. Deficiencies are notable in science-based and specialist supplier sectors (Guerrieri, 1993) . The question today is whether these potential, inherited (ii) In the institutional structure of socialist systems of innovation, industrial institutes played the dominant role both in terms of personnel and in terms of expenditure.
10 University R&D capacities were comparatively less developed while the 'in-house' R&D capacities of industrial enterprises were marginal. See Table 1 , with Russia as an example. Contrary to the situation in most Western countries, universities did not play an important part in basic science; rather, the AoS played the leading role. In applied R&D, universities played a more important role, comparable to that of the AoS, with industrial institutes dominating applied R&D. Almost all development work was done within these institutes. In all types of R&D, industrial enterprises played a marginal role. See Table 2 , again using Russia as an example.
Such an inherited institutional structure is inappropriate in a market economy where enterprise 'in-house' R&D capacities dominate and universities play the leading role in basic research, with contract R&D limited in scope. High externalization of R&D services and a developed 'quasi-market' for R&D services is an important inherited institutional imbalance which complicates R&D restructuring. By this I mean the relatively small 'in-house' R&D capacities of industrial enterprises and the hyper-developed sector of branch institutes (extra-mural R&D). The total number of non-university-based and non-enterprise-based research scientists and engineers (RSE) was 2-4 times higher in socialist countries than in Western countries (Radosevic, 1994) .
This institutional heritage represents the biggest problem in restructuring R&D. The socialist system did not have developed R&D in industry a By industrial institutes I do not mean enterprise 'in-house' R&D, but extra-mural, mainly branch, institutes. ('in-house' R&D) but had developed R&D for industry ('industry R&D').
11 By R&D for industry I mean juridicialJy independent institutes, which were part of former combinates (here I call such a relationship 'hierarchy'), as well as the R&D that was carried out under contract for other enterprises. 12 Although arranged through the hierarchy, it was not an 'in-house' relationship but a specific form of contracting of not only R&D but also industrial engineering. Figure 1 shows the differences between western and eastern German systems of R&D by distinguishing between R&D for industry, R&D in industry and R&D not oriented towards industry. It follows that 'in-housing' R&D would be the best possible scenario for restructuring R&D in post-socialist countries. However, I later show that this is not yet the case.
(iii) Old and new priorities: post-socialist economies have abandoned the system based on soft budget constraint (SBC) types of incentives (Kornai, 1992) .
13 'Soft incentives' reduced the problem of legal appropriability of R&D results but increased the problem of providing incentives to innovate and to transfer technology through hierarchies. In fact, the problem of providing incentives to invest was solved by obligatory contributions towards enterprises' funds for technological development, which were " This is explicitly recognized in Russian R&D statistics which classify R&D according to four institutional sectors: academic sector, higher education sector, industrial R&D organizations and industrial enterprises.
" R&D contracting was not confined to industrial institutes. For example, in Bulgaria in 1988 universities received 69% of funding for research from industry, which involved as many u 67% of the university staff (Simeonova, 1994b) . " This is the mainstream interpretation of the way centrally planned economies functioned. The notion implies that the strict relationship between expenditures and earnings is relaxed, since excess expenditures will be paid by some other institution. Such mechanisms lead to the expectations of soft budget constraint in the future, thus creating a system based on four types of 'softening' methods (Kornai, 1992 , p. 142): soft subsidy; soft taxation; soft credit; and soft administrative prices. These methods lead to chronic shortages, the result of which is an insatiable demand, not tempered by the possibility of bankruptcy. In such conditions, the bottlenecks are pervasive and R&D resources are therefore put into the areas with the biggest shortages.
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BSD not oriented towards industry FRG DDr Acad. of Sci. Indust. inst. Universities distributed through ministries, but based on contracts between R&D supplier and user. The notion of soft budget constraint implies an insatiable demand and the need for planners to allocate resources to areas above the normal level of shortages. From this we would expect R&D funding to have been allocated to those areas which might alleviate shortages above the normal level. Since it is difficult to see ex post a substantial shift in priorities in socialism, an alternative (or complementary) explanation of the socialist economies is needed. The interpretation of socialist economies as based on bargaining probably better reflects their economic behaviour during the 1980s (see Kuznetsov, 1994) . l4 The inherited structure of R&D specialization can be seen as the result of 'bargaining' and not as the outcome of efforts to alleviate the most acute 'shortages'.
Whichever of these two explanations we accept, the fact is that post-socialist economies have inherited hyper-developed R&D capacities in mechanical engineering, but are much weaker in electronics and software (Katkalo, 1993) . 'Overinvestment' in R&D is partly the result of the specific technological profile of EE countries, which grew fastest in the 1950s when " This explanation starts from the notion of the 'captured planner', who a, by definition, powerless to enforce his/her own plans. In this situation the economy it governed not in a hierarchical, but in a network, fashion. Hence the socialist economy is seen as an exchange-based economy, where everything is an object of exchange (finance, materials, power, favours, etc.) (Kuznetsov, 1994) . The implication of this view is that investments are then not allocated to bottlenecks and towards the most acute shortage!, but are the result of group bargaining and monopoly power of the relevant hierarchy, not directly linked to the shortage of services it provides. 'Normal level of shortages' are not the main criteria, but the agreement of all parties involved. 'Plan' is only an additional argument to shape subsequent network interaction. much of this growth was based on the diversification of an industrial structure based on mechanical technologies. However, 'overinvestment' in R&D is primarily a result of the closed character of these economies during the centrally planned period, when much of the technology effort was of the 'reinventing the wheel' type. Restructuring these 'distorted' capacities, especially when these are incompetent and, from a market point of view, irrelevant, is an important aspect of industrial restructuring in post-socialist countries.
In summary, post-socialist economies have inherited relatively welldeveloped, absorptive innovation and R&D capacities, and an externalized and (for the market economy) highly unbalanced S&T system. How can such systems adjust to a new structure of market-based incentives and to the conditions of hard budget constraints when the ability to restructure is limited by the sheer scale of the restructuring problem?
The Shock of Marketization and the Erosion of R&D Systems in Central and Eastern Europe: Effects and DynamicsT
he sharp decrease of GDP and industrial production in EE during the 1989-1993 period eroded their R&D systems. This process was accompanied by the following phenomena: the fast marginalization of once hyperdeveloped R&D; the collapse of industrial demand for R&D; changes in industry demand for R&D; the polarization of the R&D spectrum; and a changing institutional landscape.
Marginalization of R&D Systems
The radically changed macro-economic circumstances after 1989 have caused the rapid erosion of R&D systems in EE economies. However, this erosion was gradual and already noticeable throughout the 1980s. The former GDR, Romania and Bulgaria were the only countries that experienced continued growth in the number of R&D personnel until 1988 (GDR, Romania) and 1990 (Bulgaria) (Freeman and Radosevic, 1994) . In all other countries the decline began in the mid-1980s. In this respect the period 1989-1993 looks more like the end of a long-term trend.
" The process of erosion of R&D in post-socialist countries stands in sharp contrast to the situation in comparable medium-income economies and represents a peculiar specificity of the 'transition' process. In that respect, the situation of European poit-tocialist economies is somewhat in contrast to China, also considered a country in transition. The difference probably has to do with the growth in the Chinese economy and a radical reduction in industrial production for all European post-socialist countries from 1989 to 1993. The fall in R&D at the beginning of the 1990s came as a result of sharp cuts in public expenditure for R&D, and of the collapse of industry demand for R&D. The decrease in GERD/GDP ratios is from levels of -2% of GDP to 1% and less (see Table 3 ). Relative R&D expenditures in these countries are now somewhat closer to relative expenditures of medium-income economies, although even after downswing their R&D they still 'overinvest' (Auriol and Radosevic, 1996; Radosevic, 1996c) . 16 The number of RSE has decreased at a similar pace, ranging from 20 to 40% (see Table 4 ). Despite significant absolute decreases, in terms of relative employment (number of RSE per 10,000 population) EE is still above levels of comparable economies (Auriol and Radosevic, 1996) . Government S&T budget reductions, together with changed and significantly reduced R&D demand from industry, are the two main causes of the R&D collapse. Governments tried to accommodate this either by radical (e.g. Czech Republic) or by gradual (e.g. Romania and Russia) substitution of institutional finance for grant finance. This opened the way for the introduction of peer review systems on different scales in different countries. The idea was to either gradually or radically heighten the criteria of research quality in an attempt to open domestic S&T communities to world standards, as well as to introduce grant systems, which would differentiate institutions. Budget cuts were the final push towards changes that were inevitable anyhow. Tightened budgets often did not allow for gradualism, the consequence being a simplified and rather unsophisticated way of selecting institutes eligible for public funding [Czech Republic (Muller, 1993 ), Poland (Jasinski, 1994 ]. In areas where bibliometric indicators are of limited value, short-cut solutions are especially inappropriate. Although grant systems and peer review mechanisms are 'legalized' in all EE countries, these are not yet widespread in practice. However, even if applied on a modest scale, as in the case of the Russian Foundation for Basic Reseatch, its effects are much stronger than indicated by the share of funds distributed in such a way (Fortov, 1994) . The transformation of the AoS into learned societies, and the marketization of industrial institutes and some academic institutes were important ad hoc actions which released ministerial structures from duties of which they no longer considered themselves in charge. In situations where ministries envisaged the possibility of funding for institutes under their jurisdiction, they were willing to retain some responsibility. Otherwise institutes were (and still are) left to their own devices, awaiting privatization.
Changes in Industrial Demand for R&D
The slump in industrial production from 1989 to 1992 in EE countries led to the collapse of the old type of industrial demand for R&D. 17 However, case studies show signs of an emerging new type of demand, which is either non-R&D or at the lower end of the R&D spectrum (routine type of analysis). A basic change in the structure of demand is a shift towards non-R&D activities or towards non-analytical services. Intensive but monogamous interaction with users is replaced by commodified services or by reduced and much less complex interaction with users. This is a consequence of the reduction in effective demand on medium or even small-sized companies. De-concentration of industry or deconstruction of big conglomerates, once the major R&D spenders, is another important factor in the collapse of demand for R&D.
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The previous emphasis on technical complexity per se is re-focused towards the effective demand, which is for technologically simpler products.
" The magnitude of that collapse is well documented in the case of eastern Germany, where non-university research income in 1993 coming from industry was only 1.65%, a significant part of which came from western Germany The fininciaJ contribution made by the eastern German economic sector to eastern German non-university research accounted for only 0.1¥6 of its income (Meslce, 1994) .
Marketing and cost considerations come to dominate the business calculations of enterprises.
This shift in demand reflects the deficiencies inherited from the old, centrally planned system: a lack of attention to users' needs and low quality, especially in consumer industries. In Table 5 I have attempted to summarize the argument, with arrows denoting the direction of demand change.
In uncertain market conditions, enterprises in EE have effective demand only for immediate problem-solving expertise, like troubleshooting, quality improvement and small design changes. Technology and production-driven learning under socialism is being replaced by market-oriented learning in the post-socialist era. Marketing and financial management are new competencies that must be mastered at the company level. While firms in EE have successfully reoriented themselves from East to West in products based on simple production networks, this is not the case with system-type products and those based on networks of suppliers. This means that enterprises are re-focusing on these weaknesses. The shift in the technological focus of enterprises is away from production know-how and technical complexity towards marketing, finance, organization, systems integration at the product level and network-building at the firm level."
This shift towards non-tangible and non-technological assets requires new sets of competencies and know-how not yet widely available in these economies. The domestic consultancy and business services sectors are able to meet only some aspects of this new demand. Hence, restrictions exist not only on the demand side, but also on the supply side, i.e. in the inability of services and R&D systems to meet the newly emerging demand.
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It is very likely that the knowledge for removing these bottlenecks will come from the principals in subcontracting relationships, i.e. either from foreign principals or from domestic foreign affiliates. Subcontractors are obliged to meet the prescribed quality, and to deliver products on time and for a given price. However, the domestic services sector is unable to meet this demand (operation management, just-in-time systems, quality control, etc.). This negative externality for domestic enterprises slows down the process of their catching-up.
Polarization of the R&D Spectrum
In circumstances where governments tried to stop any sort of transfers from " For » wider discussion on this, see Radosevic (1996d budget to enterprises they did not see the control and finance of applied market research or diffusion as their legitimate activities. They retained responsibilities for financing basic science and university systems. This led to an increased share of the R&D budgets for basic research, to a reduction in funding for strategic and applied R&D, and to the expansion of market services. I call this phenomenon the polarization of the R&D spectrum. By this I mean the process by which pockets of basic science are preserved and developed, either through international cooperation or budget financing, where demand for development work is significantly restructured and reduced, and where the demand for strategic and applied R&D has almost disappeared. As a result the R&D spectrum becomes very thin in the middle of the chain.
21
A good example of such polarization is the Russian pattern of R&D expenditure, which has changed noticeably in just 3 years (Table 6) .
Polarization means that the share of strategic and applied R&D is shrinking, the scientific community is further marginalized, and public policy is unable to bridge the increasing gap between science and technology communities. 22 While in the past the scientific community tried to legitimize itself by showing its practical relevance, now it tries to foster legitimacy by presenting itself as 'pure science' or as having 'national' or 'cultural' value. The biggest victims of this situation are 'transfer sciences', i.e. fields dependent on interaction with basic sciences and production engineering (chemical and software engineering, for example). This is logical as the production networks underlying them are broken down or very much thinned 
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out.
23 This shift towards the lower end of the R&D spectrum denotes the increasing dominance of non-R&D activities like measuring, testing and quality control. These are areas for which there is a growing demand from domestic exporters.
Changes in the Institutional Landscape
Despite the fact that industrial institutes represented the biggest restructuring problem in R&D, the attentions of S&T policy makers and analysts had so far been confined to the AoS and their transformation. In eastern Germany (Meske, 1994) they have been dissolved. In Latvia, the AoS have been transformed into learned societies (Tjunina and Kristapson, 1994) and their old functions dissolved. In other countries, they have been retained as administrative structures with much less power to distribute funds as the share of institutional finance decreases. 24 Only in Romania, where, during the Ceasescu regime, the AoS were almost dismantled, have they had relatively more public funding. As a result of reductions in institutional finance and the increased use of the grants system and peer review selection mechanisms, much of the former basis of the academies has been lost. In some countries, like Hungary, AoS play a constructive role in assisting institutes to commercialize some of their accumulated knowledge and expertise. AoS funding has been replaced in all countries by national funds for " There are some indications th»t the areas suffering from this 'purification drive', at least in the case of Bulgaria, are chemistry (cf. chemical engineering) and biology (cf. biotechnology) (Simeonova, 1994b) .
" In Bulgaria, one-third of AoS institutes have dosed down as a result of evaluation (Simeonova, 1994b) , and the AoS institutes are also being reoriented towards fundamental research, thus acquiring a more 'puristic' science profile (Simeonova, 1994b) . funding science. All sectors are eligible for this funding (i.e. AoS institutes, universities, independent institutes). However, these funding sources are usually confined to disciplinary research. Support for interdisciplinary, technology-oriented research is not stimulated as it is considered 'illegitimate'. The old mechanisms of linking the AoS with industry and regions are considered inappropriate in the new market context and have not been replaced by new types of public-private R&D links.
Despite the widespread polemics about the future of the AoS, I would argue that the future of industrial institutes is the most controversial issue in the reconfiguration of EE innovation systems. How can enterprises be induced to internalize (to 'in-house') some of their industrial institutes capacities? Should industrial institutes be privatized at all-and if so, which ones and by what means? These issues are very relevant for industrial restructuring in EE economies since the future competitiveness of any industrial sector will be influenced by the availability of either 'in-house' or 'extra-mural' R&D capacities. Industrial institutes could play a very important role in bridging academic results with industry needs, and assist industry to meet foreign standards of quality and efficiency. If that potential is lost, they could become one of the weakest links in the chain with the renewal of growth. The inability to preserve industrial applied R&D through public subsidies until a revival in demand is the most worrying aspect of S&T policy in EE. 25 This has been exacerbated by the long period of 'spontaneous privatization', in which generic knowledge and capabilities, for which there is a potential demand in the long term, are deteriorating. The best solution for industrial institutes is their transformation into in-house capacities of industrial enterprises or into semi-public, semi-private technology services institutions. The short-term horizons of industrial enterprises and the great uncertainties in which they operate, coupled with governments' refusal to deal with restructuring, make such an option very unlikely in the medium term.
A new situation is the changing institutional landscape of NSI in EE. Emphasis in science is shifting towards universities, although it seems very unlikely that ex-AoS institutes, whose science competencies are probably still higher, will disappear altogether. 26 However, the financial stability of universities, which comes from teaching, represents an important advantage 21 In the case of eastern Germany, most non-university R&D institutions ore on government budgets (with an average 83% of income coming from that source) (Meslce, 1994) . The rest of their funding comes from public institutions. In that sense, although the eastern German case might seem a very radical fall in terms of R&D personnel, it is the most generous in terms of public subsidies for the remaining institutions and personnel. a In Bulgaria, >55% of all publications in international journals belong to BAS researchers (Simeonova, 1994b) . This is quite understandable, given the resources for research as well as the research orientation of the academies.
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in the long term. It becomes more difficult to justify the financing of basic research in independent institutes or within AoS. In addition, discussion on the role of the AoS has lost much of its rational basis and became a political issue in many countries.
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In conclusion, it is probably still too early to outline the future institutional configuration of NSI in EE. The only visible shifts are either towards a model where ex-AoS institutes will retain some sort of association and participate significantly in the public R&D budget, 28 or towards a model where universities will dominate in public research. However, the crucial matter is the future of applied and technology-oriented research in the situation where in-housing of industrial R&D has not occurred on any significant scale. This problem may be formulated in the following way: Will EE countries become similar to other middle-income economies where business R&D is extremely weak and where the majority of R&D, quite often unrelated to the needs of country, is concentrated in public institutions?
Marketization and Restructuring of Technology Capital' in Central and Eastern Europe
Putting industrial institutes on the market immediately was, financially and ideologically, the easiest way to get rid of a problem where policy makers could not see immediate costs but only potential benefits. The expectations are that, through marketization and privatization, it will be possible to capitalize on the value of accumulated R&D. 29 The idea is that R&D institutions can be simply reconnected with users through marketing technologies (Shu Lin, 1994) . Technology market and privatization are perceived as the main, necessary and sufficient solution. It is forgotten that these changes should be accompanied by restructuring and capitalization to realize the full benefits of accumulated R&D. The experience of the 1989-1995 period shows that marketization was not successful because of a lack of demand for R&D services, and because big, old-type institutes could not restructure themselves fast enough to meet patches of emerging demand. The current 77 Supporters of the Academy is a model were usually discredited as 'those from the old system'. For an overview on thb debate see Balus (1997). 9 In Germany, the inclusion of eastern German R&D meant a significant extension of extra-mural R&D.
" The underlying theoretical perspective of such a policy is that technology is a commodity, which in essence b the way socialism treated technology and the way it a seen in the neo-classical framework. Theoretical objections to that view are already well known: contracts in technology are always imperfect; technology a often firms-specific, which limits its transfersbility; and technology transfer by itself is not sufficient and requires absorptive capabilities and complementary investments. situation in most countries is best described as a stalemate where there is neither privatization nor restructuring.
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In what follows I will outline several transformation patterns within NSI in EE. These are: a massive relocation of professionals from R&D to other sectors; intensive micro-restructuring at the level of institutes; the rise of 'spin-off companies; and the privatization and internationalization of NSI.
'Brain Relocation'
The re-location of personnel from the 'science and scientific services sector' to other sectors was already intensive in socialist countries during the second half of the 1980s. For example, in the ex-USSR it amounted to 500,000 employees in the 1985/86-1990 period, equivalent to all R&D personnel in a country like Ukraine. On average, the decrease was 11%, taking the year with the maximum employment during the 1980s as a basis (Radosevic, 1994b) . It intensified during the 1990-1993 period and reached saturation point in most countries after 1994 (Auriol and Radosevic, 1996) .
A percentage of researchers, engineers, and other employees leaving the R&D system are shown in Table 7 , compared with unemployment rates.
We see that in all countries outflows are significant and at similar levels, irrespective of different unemployment rates in the respective countries. This implies that structural change is taking place in all EE economies via the relocation of employment into other sectors. The difference between low unemployment rates in all CIS countries (the Russian unemployment rate in 1993 was 1%) and high rates in smaller EE countries is not present in R&D, where, with the exception of Poland, we find similar rates of outflows from R&D. However, these outflows still do not present a true picture of real employment in R&D, as they hide high under-employment and the function of the R&D sector as a temporary shelter before departures to other sectors."
Getting a picture of the real size of these transfers is important to gain an understanding of the structural changes that have occurred in these economies during the transition. Industrial employment decreased and employment in services increased. However, R&D is probably the only service sector in ex-socialist countries where employment is decreasing.
32 How should we c The effects of non-restructuring »re that many units are led to spontaneous privatization, forced to juggle services and production. They are not 'adding up in the aggregate neither to an efficient and effective public industrial extension system nor to an R&D infrastructure able to address the longec-range technical problems of technical importance' (Eisemon a ml., 1990, p. 6). evaluate this large-scale relocation of people? Is it a phenomenon which should be supported or is there an element of truth in strategies for saving science? I will try, very briefly, to formulate one possible approach to the problem. The criteria for evaluating R&D outflows should consist not of static costs and benefits but of their dynamic effects. In a static framework any relocation to jobs with higher rewards should be understood as a welfare increasing allocative shift. For example, if a physicist becomes a taxi driver, this should be considered a positive move since it improves on the social welfare of the former situation: an unemployed scientist. The dynamic aspect of the problem could be taken into account by assuming, as economists often do, that the characteristics of human capital are not only acquired skills but also the ability to learn. The problem-solving expertise, alongside profession-specific expertise, is, to a great extent, general, and therefore transferable. If the problem-solving expertise is relocated to areas where it can improve the value added, then we can talk of its positive welfare effects in dynamic terms. For example, if a physicist becomes a good banker or competent administrator in a privatization agency, the acquired problem-solving expertise will enable him to improve not only his own, but also the social welfare. Welfare gains through a better allocation of problem-solving expertise compensates for losses of investment in specific professional expertise. In the case where the physicist becomes a taxi driver, we may guess that his/her acquired problem-93 solving expertise will no longer be utilized. If he/she moves into areas where this expertise cannot be used, welfare losses occur. This last phenomenon should not be ruled out in post-socialist economies. Although it can be temporary, it implies the problem of forgetting and of a depreciation of problem-solving expertise and thus the deterioration of a knowledge-based economy. Obviously the crucial issue is under what conditions it is possible to return to technology-based growth, whereby problem-solving expertise developed in R&D could be redeployed in new S&T activities. In summary, outflows from R&D are not negative as long as the developed problem-solving expertise is redeployed more productively in other areas, usually in services. A fall in R&D employment to levels 'natural' for medium-sized economies (Radosevic, 1994) should be judged in the context of growth in production and business services. If these are not growing quickly enough to absorb inflows from the R&D system, there is some rationale for 'science-saving' strategies. However, Table 7 shows that this is not yet the case, as the outflows are mainly voluntary.
Internal (Micro) Restructuring
Internal restructuring is an action taken by R&D institutions attempting to adjust to straitened financial conditions and to reduced, but also changed, patterns of R&D demand. The two dominant modes of micro-adjustment are internal cost-cutting measures by splitting institutes into self-financing profit centres, and/or a diversification of activities into services and production to meet new demand. Both of these activities are accompanied by thinning organizations, most often, at least in the case of researchers and engineers, through voluntary lay-offs. Staff cuts in R&D are higher amongst auxiliary personnel.
33 A short-term consequence of this transition is an increase in the qualification structures in the most qualified groups (PhDs).
Splitting-up and profit centre restructuring. Splitting big institutes into several independent institutes, and these, in turn, into profit centres, is a very common survival response to the shock of marketization in EE. Smaller, coherent R&D groups take responsibility for their own survival and prosperity. This leads to a streamlining of overheads, to reductions in auxiliary personnel and to the introduction of individual contracts. The consequence is a very disparate financial situation across different groups and the emergence of a new problem: the inability of boards to strategically manage business portfolios, since the possibilities for cross-subsidization and synergies are restricted. While cost efficiency and flexibility have improved to a great extent in the medium term, the possibilities for developing a knowledge base and for expansion into new areas are limited in the long run.
Transitory hybridization and its limits. The increasing difficulties of maintaining real incomes through research have led to a widespread expansion into services and production activities. Hybrid institutions, combining research, production and services, are not a new phenomenon in post-socialist R&D systems. Since the 1960s, the AoS have supplemented their income through contracts with industry (Dore, 1993) . Functional differentiation (hybridization) is increasing in the post-socialist period, as has been documented on a large sample of research-technology organizations (see Radosevic, 1997 ). The diversification is towards an increase in non-R&D activities at the expense of R&D activities. This is a demand-driven trend which in many cases leads to the transformation of these organizations into industrial and services enterprises. Increased diversification often results in rather incoherent organizations and may be considered as temporary (see Radosevic, 1996d) . First, new legal freedoms remove obstacles to the formation of different activities and spin-off firms. The recognition of the market and public spheres provides an opportunity for the separation of different activities into their natural environments. Second, hybridization (diversification) is a temporary strategy to overcome enormous uncertainties and financial difficulties present not only in R&D but right across the economy. 35 However, the extent of hybridization today creates serious problems in managing very disparate sets of activities with very different objectives and underlying ideologies. In other words, hybridization creates a problem of institutional incoherence. The effects of 'in-house' diversification on the coherence of R&D are summarized in Table 8 .
In very few cases has management succeeded in diversifying activities into production and services and still retained organizational coherence. 36 It seems " Diversification is also the main characteristic of new, fast growing eastern European private firms (Business Central Europe, 1994a).
" The reason why it was possible under the old system to have such disparate activities under the same roof was, probably, that they could not be understood as enterprises (or institutes) in the Wotcrn sense, but as part of a hierarchy. that there are clear limits to the extent to which tensions between two different activities can be managed (Stankiewicz, 1994) 37 and these represent clear limits to hybridization which should be seen as a transitory phenomenon. The institutes' diversification can be considered coherent to the extent that their constituent activities are related to one another (Teece et al., 1994) . If they are not related and yet kept within the same organization, there is the possibility that core activities will be undermined. In the case of EE, where many institutions are undergoing structural change, the core profile of institutions is changing naturally. In such cases, incoherence is an indication of positive change that may end up in coherently diversified organizations. Moreover, the old Soviet-era-style institutes were conglomerates of heterogeneous activities kept together by means of financial, hierarchical and political bonds. With changes in the environment, an increasing diversification of R&D institutions, encompassing all sorts of production and service activities within the same institution, is an unsustainable organizational form. Spin-offs in this context may be understood as mechanisms that resolve these tensions if other conditions are favourable for their growth (see following section).
Academic Spin-offs
By academic spin-offs I assume a situation where part of an institute is channelled into an independent unit under the ownership of the former institute and with the objective of capitalizing on accumulated investments in R&D. 38 The 1980s saw widespread attempts across all socialist countries to " This is also confirmed in the ctse of China, where only a few (10 out of 3000) new technology enterprises have been developed within academic iiucitutes (Shu Lin, 1994) .
" This means that the situations where employees leave an institute and set up their own small company is not considered here as a spin-off, as well as situations where institutes diversify by including production (services) in its 'in-house' activities. This latter change is interpreted here as diversification (hybridization).
capitalize on the existing R&D base. 39 In that respect, spin-offs are not a new feature of NSI in post-socialism. Spin-offs in socialist economies during the 1980s were enabled through a sort of technology quasi-market prevailing at that time. This meant that enterprises could enter into contracts with R&D institutes and did not have to obey the branch structure. This gave them freedom and induced some 'hard-budget' behaviour. In the case of EE countries no systematic internationally comparable data on the number of spin-offs is available so far [see Webster (1996) , and for a more systematic evidence in case of Russia see Tambovstev (1995) }. Country studies give the impression, first, that their number is not that great and, second, that demand constraints in EE economies have a strong impact in inhibiting their growth.
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From the NSI point of view the question is what role spin-offs play in the post-socialist innovation system. Are they a mechanism for initiating production based on innovations developed within the old system, or do they serve as problem-solving organizations, filling the missing role of consultants and technical service organizations? 41 Are they a mechanism for correcting structural deficiencies inherited from the socialist system, or are they merely an expression of survival strategies that may even undermine the coherence of some parts of the R&D system? Case studies from EE and China show that these are mechanisms for integrating the capabilities or outputs of R&D institutes with industrial production (Shu Lin, 1994) . Many of the previously semi-academic supplier organizations have fragmented into joint ventures, distributing and adding value to imported Western products. In this respect they customize foreign innovations to the needs of domestic users. The fact that almost all of the great Russian success stories in software development come from 'spin-offs' of big Soviet-era research institutes (Dyker and Stein, 1993) shows that they also capitalize, through new product developments, on the old investments in R&D.
* In Bulgaria, as early as the 1970s, 'research sectors' were formed with the objective to link up universities and academic institutes with industry. This led not only to widespread contract research but also to the establishment of small innovative firms by the beginning of 1980s. In 1988 there were 42 small firms, attached to universities and the Bulgarian AoS, with 1163 employees. Besides that, there were 121 domestic joint ventures between AoS, universities and enterprises. Also, technical centres started to be set up by the mid-1980s as bridging institutions (consultancy on technology transfer) (see Simeonova, 1994b) . Today there are some 60 small firms around AoS institutes (Simeonova, 1994b) . Since the early 1980s, employees in Hungary were allowed to set up 'small working groups' (GMK), which operated after shifts in the same laboratory but carried out production for their own sake. GMK were quasi-firms that sometimes functioned as parallel organizations to research groups (Balaszs, 1994, p. 13).
" In contrast to this situation, in China -10,000 spin-off enterprises had been established by 1993, employing some 100,000 S&T staff (Shu Lin, 1994) . 41 A review of spin-offs in OECD countries shows that their role as problem-solvers is dominant over production (Stankiewio, 1994).
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They are interface organizations filling space between production and services, or playing the role of specialized suppliers, providing small-scale components. They are the new carriers of technology diffusion accessing services and small users and specialized suppliers. In this respect one could argue that they play a positive role in NSI of post-socialist economies by improving coherence of their systems and repairing the main structural weaknesses in socialist economies: the lack of specialized suppliers and science-based subsectors (Gurreieri,1994) .
One would normally expect the EE spin-offs to become independent from their parent institutions as they grow and develop their own market. However, there is already important evidence (see Balazs, 1994) that the relationship with the parent institution is permanent and these are considered quasi-spin-offs, A new quasi-spin-off firm is usually a joint-stock company that has, to varying degrees, developed links with its parent institution and in some senses never fully spun-off.
42 Often (co)ownership of the new company is coupled with arrangements where core employees of the parent company work on a part-time basis for the new company. In the conditions where privatization is in turmoil and the legal framework is changing, this link enables the transfer of resources, knowledge and people from a public organization to a semi-public or private organization. It is difficult to find out, on the basis of evidence from scattered case studies, how widespread these cases of spontaneous privatization are, but research shows that this is an important strategy for adjustment. The different intensities of links between parent and 'spin-off companies found in the case of some EE countries are summarized in Table 9 .
What is the possible negative role of spin-offs in EE NSI? The spin-offs are usually motivated by two factors: by the market potential and by the problems of institutional coherence where the new activity is continued 'in-house'. For successful spin-offs, both conditions must be present. In the previous section we briefly discussed the problems of institutional coherence and, in that context, spin-offs are the mechanism for overcoming this problem. However, because of still patchy or negative growth in EE economies, spin-offs still do not have very bright prospects. This makes them quasi-spin-offs, which often endanger the coherence of parent institutions. In short, spin-offs can improve the coherence of NSI but if they are entirely based on survival (not growth), they can erode some parts of NSI, especially academic institutions.
While quasi-spin-offs are an expression of the objective wish to survive and increase real incomes, irrespective of institutional costs, they are also enabled by the existing legal framework, delayed privatization and the erosion of old social rules with new rules not yet being formulated. In addition to spin-offs, technology parks represent another attempt by R&D institutes to capitalize on their accumulated technical services by offering services to their own employees or to small independent firms. In that sense they can also be considered a sort of spin-off institution.
Most of these attempts are survival strategies of institutes interested in immediate income by renting facilities or offering services. Mostly they only provide physical space and facilities, very often at a market rate. They are unable to provide or assist in getting loans from banks, let alone provide their own venture capital. The services demanded by park users are still rudimentary and do not go much further than communication services. There is little synergy among companies as their portfolios range from high-tech ventures to exclusively trading companies.
Many of these ventures are supported through foreign programmes. Only in Romania do we have a case of large-scale public support for this type of activity (incubators). Very often, top-down approaches to building technology parks end in failure. More often, bottom-up approaches make sense and offer the potential for networking. 43 For a description of a few cases in the region, see Webster (1996) .
Privatization
A deep transition recession and delayed privatization have especially harmful effects on R&D, for two reasons:
" In Tallin (Estonia), there is a nice example of top-down and bottom-up approaches and their effects. The fine one is a technology park aimed at promoting clustering and technology-based growth. In reality, the outcome is very common: a set of unrelated enterprises of very different motivations and profiles, using rented rooms and communication!. The latter is an example of the survival strategy of the Institute of Cybernetics, which groups 30 small IT firms. For IT entrepreneurs, it is a natural place where they gain from informal knowledge transfers, share knowledge of markets, etc.
1. Technology is an 'intermediary product' and much depends on the state of demand for R&D services as well as on the planning horizons of enterprises. The breakdown of demand, especially for capital goods, made things worse for institutes serving these industries, which, in socialist economies, formed the majority of R&D.
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2. In conditions of high uncertainty and prolonged privatization, the intangible assets and know-how of industrial institutes, primarily embodied in R&D groups, probably erodes much faster than production skills in industry. The departure of a few key members of R&D and engineering groups reduces the competence level by a disproportionate amount.
Privatization is a process of ownership transformation that very often changes the profile of an institute into an industrial or service enterprise. The transformation of R&D has not progressed too far in EE economies. 45 Due to the slow privatization process, spontaneous privatization is quite often the predominant form of transformation of industrial institutes. While in industry the main effect of spontaneous privatization is the transfer of financial assets, in the case of R&D it is the transfer of accumulated results, know-how and knowledge into the commercial services or products of a new company. Whether institutes should first be restructured and then sold, or first privatized, leaving the new owners with the responsibility of restructuring, is a problem common to all industries in post-socialist countries. The additional specificity in the case of R&D is whether privatization should occur at all. The question can be reformulated in terms of whether industrial institutes are considered as any other company or whether they have some specific features that call for their different treatment. The issue of welfare losses or gains through the privatization of R&D can be understood by introducing the distinction between generic and private knowledge embodied in industrial R&D. For this purpose I will define generic knowledge as knowledge for which private firms are not willing or not able to pay the marginal costs of its production and maybe even distribution, but are willing to use it. Private knowledge is the kind for which firms are willing to pay marginal costs of production and distribution. When knowledge is treated as a commodity there should be no problems with privatization. However, since knowledge is not a commodity (Arrow, 1994) but a specific asset with strong public elements, it contains generic elements for which firms would not like to pay but would nevertheless like to use. In other words, the market has a very limited ability to evaluate such knowledge. From the NSI perspective, it is important to retain a generic type of technological capability and research. These types of capability are usually supported through publicprivate schemes that are not yet built up in these economies. This implies that, in the medium term, such capabilities are in danger of being lost.
The decision to privatize means that 'boundaries between near market research and all other research had to be identified and imposed on the institution from outside' (Webster, 1989) . If only a part of an institute is to be privatized, then a decision must be made as to what should be included in the privatization. The next problem is what the future relationship between public science base and newly privatized firm will be if it is to pursue any R&D. In the areas where the mix of disciplinary expertise is sine qua non, privatization will not solve the problem, as it will create a new gap between the public and private spheres that will have to be filled by new 'bridging institutions' or new institutions altogether. In many areas of technology, expertise does not operate along this basic/applied research dichotomy (Webster, 1989) . In the case of mass privatization, new gaps in systems of innovation might emerge.
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What are the possibilities for minimizing the costs of mass privatization on R&D and yet avoiding the drawbacks of delayed case-by-case privatization? Unfortunately, as has been the case in eastern Germany, 'no one is willing to buffer the change and allow industrial research to become a competitor' (Sabel, 1993) . The possibility of transforming industrial institutes into ** If the UK experience of R&D privatization a any guide, it shows the following problems. Pint, linki between different research activities must be taken into account. Second, if some type of 'near-market research' is not to be financed by new private owners, it may lead to the stoppage of other related areas, which are stopped as it is no longer economical for firms to finance them on their own. Third, since research will not be funded by public money, industry should compensate for it. Fourth, strategic research is not funded by any one in that situation.
semi-public/semi-private industry-oriented infrastructures, part of which can later on be 'in-housed' when the financial and strategic profile of industry improves, is very weak.
Internationalization NSI in socialist economies were closed systems. Their opening inevitably changed their profile fundamentally. By greatly simplifying I will emphasize here three channels through which the internationalization of EE NSI is already going on. These are: science communication, foreign direct investments (FDI) and sub-contracting.
If judged by their science publications, scores of socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, ranked relatively low when taking into account the size of their R&D investments, although only just immediately below OECD countries (Freeman and Radosevic, 1994) . However, this is a misleading picture of their real science potential, since in socialist times, any scientific communication was extremely restricted, especially in the former Soviet Union. For example, in the Romanian AoS only 15% of researchers authored papers in international journals (Eisemon, 1996) . However, during the 1980s the situation started to improve. The number of papers co-authored between EE countries and the UK between 1981 and 1991 grew from 149 to 450, and accelerated even more from the mid-1980s onwards (Katz and Radosevic, in preparation) .
Bearing in mind the developed science capacities in EE, it is undoubtedly the case that many science areas will be integrated into the international science community. Integration is currently the only way for most of the science groups to prosper. R&D subcontracting, sabbatical departures, fellowships, contracts or renting out various big science facilities are the ways in which such communication develops. However, better integration into the international science community does not by itself guarantee integration with domestic technology. It is very likely that post-socialist countries may repeat the developing countries' patterns of nationally isolated but internationally integrated islands of excellent research.
FDI are a potentially powerful channel for integration of NSI into global networks and a mechanism of their structural change. In cases where FDI are accompanied by technology transfer, knowledge spillovers and clustering of subcontracting firms, they may induce demand for technical services and R&D. However, this channel might also create new gaps through enclavetype factories, unconnected with domestic suppliers and with no knowledge spillovers into domestic industry (Radosevic, 1996a,b) . It is premature tomake any generalizations on the technological effects of FDI in EE economies. Some preliminary evidence of technology transfer exists in the Hungarian car-part industry (Havas, 1994) . Also, academic spin-offs are often trade representatives of foreign companies combining their knowledge of the domestic market with some adaptive development, especially in the case of software. Indeed, there are possibilities for technological deepening of foreign investments and for their integration into value-added networks of global companies. Again, whether it will result in spillovers and clustering of domestic subcontractors is largely a domestic policy issue/ 7 Subcontracting is a much neglected channel of technological integration in S&T policy literature. The press reveals that it is developing in a few sectors in EE: in the garments, metallurgy, chemicals, automotive and food industries, and in some high-tech areas such as precision engineering, computers and software (Business Central Europe, 1994a). Technical assistance, which comes from foreign partners (principals), is an important potential source of learning and is still seen by EE firms as a necessary evil. There are indications that jobbing contracts are spreading among EE countries by distributing labour-intensive jobs to low-wage eastern European countries. Unfortunately, this mechanism of technology transfer is impossible to fully capture through statistics where it is registered as a 'normal' trade, except for the 'outward processing traffic' type of subcontracting. 48 ' 49 In summary, the processes of internationalization of previously closed NSI in EE are changing them in ways that are still difficult to quantify. All channels mentioned for unking domestic with foreign S&T are fairly new opportunities for EE countries, but by themselves do not guarantee the domestic and international integration of their systems of innovation. The degree of integration of international science with domestic technology, technology deepening of FDI and technology learning via subcontracting links are examples of a domestic strategy designed to exploit these possibilities.
Conclusions
I have outlined several general processes in EE economies which are seen as important elements of transformation of their systems of innovation, " For * longer discussion on technology transfer issues related to foreign direct investments in a globalized and liberalized context see Radotevic (1994d).
" Outward processing is a form of subcontracting where the foreign customer supplies the local producer with raw material and inputs which are then fabricated and re-exported to the customer. For an analysis of this form of subcontracting, see Naujoks and Schmidt (1994) . " Some estimates are that, for example, at least 50% of Czech exports to Germany and Austria comprise product! manufactured within the framework of jobbing contracts (Business Central Europe, 1994b). especially in R&D. These processes indicate that transformation of NSI in the post-socialist economies of EE is evolving between restructuring and erosion of potentially viable R&D capacities. They are part of a transitional conundrum where elements of survival and restructuring are mixed. Despite complexities of this process it is possible to come to the three following conclusions.
First, I emphasized in Part 1 that the best way to restructure hyperdeveloped extra-mural R&D capacities in post-socialist economies is to 'in-house' or integrate them into industrial enterprises. This would be the shortest way to expand a thin layer of 'in-house' R&D in industry. On the basis of the available evidence we see that 'in-housing' of R&D was not widespread in the early phases of post-socialism. Moreover, the cases of eastern Germany (Meske, 1994) and China (Shu Lin, 1994) show this to be rare in these countries, too. This shows that the firm specificity of R&D and technological knowledge is strongly present in general and inhibits automatic integration of R&D into enterprises.
Second, if EE continues to grow, spin-offs are likely to improve the coherence of their NSI by creating new links between research and production. Generally, spin-offs improve the distributive capability of NSI (Foray and David, 1994) and improve its coherence (Chesnais, 1992) by filling up the missing 'grey zone' between R&D, services and manufacturing. Several authors (Balazs, 1994; Shu Lin, 1994; Stankiewicz, 1994) already recognize that the formation of spin-offs creates institutions which bridge the gap between academia and business by providing technical services, problemsolving expertise and specialized supplies. In this way, they remove the key structural weaknesses of ex-socialist economies, namely specialized suppliers and science-based industries.
Third, privatization alone (if not accompanied by restructuring support) will create new gaps in the knowledge base. These will have to be cured through building a new layer of public-private interaction mechanisms and through the renewal of strategic research. The overmanned R&D systems of ex-socialist economies also requires privatization as a way of getting rid of many R&D activities that the market will weed out. However, limited policy implementation ability, combined with the lack of industrial policy, will impose social costs through the destruction of viable areas of strategic and near market research.
This analysis has strong limitations in the sense that it is based on the notion that the national level plays a crucial role in the re-configuration of innovation systems. Such a perspective undermines the role of the industry level and the transformation of different production networks. This mezzo 104 level is very helpful in better understanding the emergence of innovation systems in EE. However, high specificity, the lack of a conceptual approach in analysing very disparate sectoral innovation systems and, finally, the lack of comparative research on the actual restructuring of different industrial sectors are important obstacles to this line of research.
As emphasized in the introduction, besides macro and micro factors, the transformation of EE NSI is significantly affected by changes in production networks. The socialist system was characterized by vertical networks, production naturalization and the absence of horizontal relations. 50 During the 1989-1994 period, it is mainly the simple production networks, like those in woodworking and the garment industry, that have re-oriented themselves from East to West. We are now seeing their speedy integration into subcontracting networks with Western partners and some very rudimentary clustering at a local level." In the cases of more complex production networks, like those in machinery sectors, where inputs have to be supplied from several enterprises and where payments per unit are much higher, they are surviving through barter. Future research on the mezzo level may reveal emerging patterns of industrial restructuring and the creation of new local and sectoral systems of innovation in EE. An S&T system, isolated from production and treated as a separate branch ('science and scientific services'), is now under reconstruction. Changes in relations between R&D and production, in sources and patterns of innovation can be noticed first at the mezzo level. The current absolute dominance of the economic research programme on EE by 'transition economies' issues (privatization, trade liberalization, bank reforms, enterprise restructuring) will, hopefully, give place to issues of technology and industrial restructuring. It is in factors of dynamic, and not static, allocative efficiency that socialist economies failed (Murrel, 1990) . Accordingly, factors of recovery of these economies should be sought in factors within the Schumpeterian perspective.
